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I. Introduction 
Findings from different studies on smallholder horticultural production have led to the 
general impression that it has tremendous potential for development. This recognition has led in 
a rather natural way to efforts that are aimed at improving the productivity of horticultural crops 
on-farm, as well as investing in post-harvest handling facilities. A number of organizations are 
currently working on improving the adoption of modem production techniques and improved 
crop cultivars. This research contends that, alongside these absolutely important farm-level 
efforts to improve technical efficiency in horticultural production, concurrent emphasis should be 
placed on understanding the performance of the smallholder horticultural marketing system. 
This paper is a culmination of two closely related studies on smallholder horticultural 
marketing in Zimbabwe, jointly sponsored by the Cornell International Institute for Food and 
Agricultural Development (CIIFAD) and the Rockefeller Foundation. Gibson Guvheya's 
masters thesis study appraised the performance of the domestic smallholder horticultural market 
by evaluating the degree of spatial market integration, while Edward Mabaya investigated the 
links among market structure, margins earned, direction of price flow and symmetry in price 
transmission (Guvheya, 1988; Mabaya:~.1988). Data used in these studies was collected through 
field surveys in Zimbabwe in the summer and fall of 1996. 
The broad objective of this study is to gather information on the functioning of domestic 
horticultural markets to provide a basis for improving the performance of the smallholder 
horticultural marketing system. The following three specific objectives will be addressed in this 
paper: 
-

1. To determine the marketing margins earned by participants in the various 
marketing channels used by smallholder farmers. 
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2. To examine price causality and transmission along the marketing channels. 
3. To appraise the performance of the domestic horticultural market by evaluating the 
degree of spatial market integration. 
II. Marketing Margins 
Marketing margins are differences between prices at different levels in the marketing 
channel. They capture the proportion of the final selling price that a particular agent in the 
marketing chain adds, thus providing linkages between prices at various levels in the distribution 
system. Even though the magnitude of a margin is not indicative of operational efficiency, their 
variance across participants is usually suggestive of areas for consideration in improving 
efficiency. Margins that vary widely among participants at the same level often reflect price 
inefficiency at that level. Response of marketing margins to price changes (at any level of the 
channel) is also indicative of the efficiency of the channel. Where middlemen are few and 
market information is not available at fann level, increases in consumer prices often take long to 
be transmined to the farmer. This pheI.10menon leads to the calculation of price transmission and 
stability of margins. 
Data 
Average weekly tomato wholesale prices were used to calculate margins between 
successive levels along the major marketing channels used by smallholder farmers. The weekly 
prices only reflect a five-day week because data was usually not collected over the weekend. 
Farm-gate prices are represented by price paid to farmers at Murewa Growth Point, while ­
wholesale price is the price received by farmers and rural merchants l:it Mbare Musika. 
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The Model 
Marketing margins were calculated using the concurrent method, whereby prices at 
consecutive levels of the marketing channel are compared at the same point in time. Hence, a 
marketing margin is specified as: 
MJ = pL _ p(L-l) 
ttl 
where, 
Mit = Marketing margin between market level (L) and its preceding level (L-1) 
pit = Price at market level (L) 
pIL- J \ = Price at market level (L-1). 
Where marketing margins at different levels of the marketing chain are to be compared, it 
is common to use the consumer price as the common denominator for 
all margins. The following are some commonly used indicators that will be used in the analysis: 
Total Gross Marketing Margin (TGMM) 
Consumer Price-Farmer IS PriceTGAfAf = * 100 
Consumer Price 
.~ 
Farmer's Portion or Producer's Gross Marketing Margin (PGMM) 
PGAfAf = Consumer Price - Afarketing Gross Afargin * 100 
Consumer Price 
-

1 In the 'Concurrent Method', prices prevailing at successive stages of the marketing 
channel are compared at the same point in time. For a discussion of the relative merits of this 
method see (Market Research and Planning Cell, 1985). 
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Results and Discussion 
Absolute prices at the different levels are illustrated in Figure 1, where the different 
margins are depicted by the vertical distance between the relevant price series. 
The magnitude of the margins is now considered. The average farm-wholesale gross 
margin (FWGM) of $0.44/kg is much lower than the wholesale-retail gross margin (WRGM) of 
$1.76/kg. The two add up to an average total gross marketing margin (TGMM) of $2.19/kg. 
Considering the average retail price of $4.75/kg, the total marketing margins are significantly 
high, accounting for 43 percent of the total price paid by the consumer. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that marketing costs account for a large portion of the consumers' dollar. Improving 
efficiency in the marketing channel could go a long way in increasing income for rural farmers 
and/or ensuring affordable prices to the urban consumer. 
A word of caution is in order before we attempt to explain the individual margins. Kolhs 
and Uhl (1980) clarify four of the widely held misconceptions about the food marketing margin. 
Figure 1. Average Daily Prices (July 1996) 
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First, the magnitude of a margin is not indicative ofmarketing margins for horticultural crops. 
Though inefficiencies prevail in food marketing functions, "efficiency cannot be judged solely by 
the size of a marketing margin". Second, the size of a margin does not depend on the number of 
middlemen, but instead on the number and cost of marketing services. Third, an inverse 
relationship between the size of margins and farm prices is not always the case (i.e., "large 
margin do not cause low farm prices"). For example, some marketing services such as 
advertising and merchandising will increase margin but ultimately increase demand for thereby 
increasing producer prices. Lastly, the size of margins are not a measure of additional profits that 
can be gained by farmers and consumers by assuming the role of middlemen. "There is no 
guarantee that farmers or consumers will perform marketing functions as efficiently as 
middlemen and thus capture food marketing profits" (Kolhs and Uhl, p213). 
To comment on profitability at the different levels, we need information on costs so as to 
calculate net margins. The farm-wholesale margin of $0.44/kg is relatively low. Much of this 
margin goes to covering transport costs, the major value adding activity at this level. The 
Mashonaland East Fruit and Vegetable\Program (MEFVP), a major transporter in the study area, 
charges about $3.00 per 15kg box of tomatoes that reduces to about $0.20/kg. Other forms of 
transport are relatively more expensive. Murewa (the study area) is considerably close to Harare 
(80km of tarred road) and well serviced with good transport infrastructure. The close proximity 
to a major urban wholesale market and the large concentration of horticultural farmers attracts 
more wholesalers and other agent middlemen to this area, facilitating more competitive behavior. 
­
Thus, when compared to other rural areas, the low farm- wholesale margins should be taken as 
an exception rather than the rule. Further, margins vary widely with distance from urban 
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markets and the time of the year (seasonality). In distant and/or remote rural areas, prices can be 
extremely low since wholesale prices remain the same while the farm-wholesale margin 
increases. The relatively low farm retail margin can also be accredited to the high economies of 
scale earned by middlemen at this level that reduce marketing costs per kilogram. 
The average wholesale retail gross margin (WRGM) of $1.76/kg is relatively high, 
accounting for 34.69% ofthe consumer's dollar. Since our wholesale price reflects mainly the 
price paid to farmers and other rural merchants at Mbare Musika wholesale market, the other 
wholesaling expenses and profits are accommodated in the wholesale-retail margin in addition to 
costs incurred by retailers. Costs contained in this margin include labor, transportation, 
packaging material and marketing fees. Most retailers are micro-enterprises (which are much 
smaller than the average wholesaler) resulting in relatively lower economies of scale. The high 
level of fixed marketing overheads (labor, marketing fees, stall rental) are spread over a lower 
volume of produce. 
With the aid of Figure] and some correlations, the movement of margins across time can 
be analyzed further. The farm-wholes~le margin is relatively stable in absolute terms with a 
standard deviation of 0.38 and positively correlated with both farm and wholesale prices. The 
stability of the farm wholesale margin could be indicative of a mark-Up pricing structure. 
According to this model, short-run price movements at different levels are simply a reflection of 
the costs of marketing services between the two levels. This pricing structure could be unique to 
Murewa where competition among rural middlemen is substantial. 
-
Supply and demand for marketing services, as well as demand for horticultural produce, 
are relatively stable in the short-run. Therefore, it can be inferred tha,t most of the price changes 
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for horticultural products are supply induced. Gardner's static equilibrium framework holds that, 
in a free market, "... events that increase (decrease) the supply offann products will increase 
(decrease) the retail-fann price ratio (RFPR)". From laws of supply and demand, events that 
increase (decrease) supply would decrease (increase) equilibrium prices, ceteris paribus (holding 
demand constant). Putting the two together, it is expected that a negative correlation between the 
retail-farm price ratio and market prices exists. The correlation between the fann-retail price 
ratio and the market prices are as follows: -0.11 with fann prices, -0.05 with wholesale prices and 
0.40 with retail prices. Though the first two correlations are negative, they are very low. The 
positive correlation with retail prices cannot be explained using this model. The poor 
explanatory power of this model to horticultural markets lies in the assumption made by Gardner. 
Two of the basic assumptions are violated in this case; perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. Thus the results indicate some level of market imperfections and high economies of 
scale (due to high marketing overheads). This conclusion suggests possible ways of improving 
marketing efficiency to benefit fanners and consumers. 
III. Price Causality and Transmission 
The second objective consists of two related parts: examining price causality and 
transmission along the marketing channel. To gain an insight into the dynamic relationship 
among prices at different levels of the marketing channel causality and price transmission tests 
are built upon the static analysis of marketing margins. Causality tests will be used to test the 
­
direction of the price flow between the fanngate and wholesale level, and between the wholesale 
level and the retail level. This information will be used to identify points of price determination 
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along the marketing chain. Having established the direction of causality, the analysis will 
proceed to test the hypothesis of asymmetric price transmission in the market. 
Data 
For both temporal and spatial analysis, a daily time series data-set, compiled for the main 
marketing channel and covering the month of July (1996) will be used. Data was collected at 
three levels of the marketing channel, namely, the farm-gate, wholesale and retail levels. Figure 
2 below shows daily tomato prices. 
A. Price Causalit)· 
Implicit from Figure 2 is the existence of high positive correlations between prices at 
different levels of the marketing channel. As discussed in the previous section, a high positive 
correlation between prices at different levels of the marketing channel exists. Though such 
correlations reflect a degree of integration of markets at different levels, they do not tell us 
Figure 2: Average Daily Prices (July 1996) 
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anything about the direction of price causality. The direction of price flow can be estimated 
statistically through causality tests. Although the direction of price flow per se is better 
described by a priori or theoretical information, analysts have resorted to statistical tests to 
ascertain causality where theory is reticent. 
The Model 
Granger (1969) developed and applied the first widely used statistical test for causality. 
Presuming that the future cannot cause the past, past information of one variable is used to 
predict or forecast the other. If past and present price information at one level of the marketing 
channel is used to improve the forecast future prices at another level, then the former level is said 
to Granger-cause the later level. The test is based on the following model. 
n n 
FPt = 'La; WPH + 'Lb; FPH +u1t (1);=1 ;= 1 
n n 
WPt ='Lc; WPt_; +'Ld; FPt_;+u;t (2) 
;=1 ;=1 
where FP, WP and RP are as defined before. 
In words, the first equation postulates that current farm prices (FPt) are dependant on p~st 
farm prices (FPt•j ) and past and present wholesale prices (WPt.J The second equation postulates 
the same for wholesale prices (WPJ. The upper limit (n) is set at the optimal lag length and the 
error terms (u lt and U2t ) are assumed to be uncorrelated. Anyone of the following causality 
­
.. 
relationships can be tested by placing the appropriate restrictions on the model and using the F-
test to confirm statistical significance. 
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1) Unidirectional causality from WP, to FP, if the estimated coefficients on the lagged WP, 
in the first equation are as a group, statistically different from zero ( I:a j 'I' 0) and the 
estimated coefficients on the FP, in the second equation are, as a group, statistically not 
different from zero (I:d, = 0). 
2) Unidirectional causality from FP, to WP, is suggested when estimated coefficients on the 
FPH in the second equation are as a group, statistically different from zero ( I:~ '1'0) and 
the estimated coefficients on the WP,_j in the first equation are jointly statistically not 
different from zero (I:a j = 0). 
3) Independence is suggested when both sets of the lagged exogenous variables are not 
statistically different from zero (I:a j = 0 and I:d, = 0). This implies that no causal 
relationship exists between the variables. 
4) Bilateral causality or feedback exists when both sets of the lagged exogenous variables 
are, as a group, statistically significantly different from zero in both equations (I:a j 'I' 0 and 
Results and Discussion 
.' 
.~'. 
From an a priori understanding of the market information system and an inspection of 
cross correlograms (correlation between lagged prices at different levels), the optimal lag length 
was set at five days (n=5) between farm and wholesale prices and two days (n=2) between 
wholesale and retail prices. This price relationship reflects the higher market information 
efficiency between wholesale and retail levels that between wholesale and farm-gate level. In 
one command, Econometric Views (E-views) software automatically runs four OL8 equations -
,­
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consistent with Granger-causality theory. The hypothesis tested is that one variable does not 
Granger cause another. Results from these tests are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Painvise Granger Causality Test Results 
1. Farm-wholesale (Sample: 7/02/19967/31/1996 Lags: 5) 
Null Hypothesis: Obs. F-Statistic Probability 
WP does not Granger Cause FP 26 1.23615 0.34072 
FP does not Granger Cause WP 26 0.84905 0.53639 
2. Wholesale-retail (Sample: 7/02/19967/31/1996 Lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
RP does not Granger Cause WP 29 3.82284 0.03620 
WP does not Granger Cause RP 29 5.74810 0.00913 
Farm-wholesale price causality 
Results on Granger-causality between farm and wholesale prices indicate little predictive 
power of one variable on the other. Using a decision rule of «=0.05, we fail to reject both 
'. 
hypotheses (WP does not Granger CauSe FP, and FP does not Granger Cause WP) and conclude 
with 95% confidence that there is no causal relationship between the two price series (i.e., the 
price series are independent in the Granger sense). However an evaluation of the F~statistic 
probabilities indicates that the hypothesis ofWP not Granger causing FP is more likely to be 
accepted at a higher alpha level than the opposite hypothesis. This result suggests that prices are 
-
more likely to flow from wholesale to farm level than from farm level to wholesale. Our 
understanding of the market structure and conduct supports this premise. 
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Wholesale-Retail Price Causality 
Results for Granger-causality tests between wholesale and retail prices presented in Table 
1 indicate a strong predictive power ofRP on WP and similarly for WP on RP. Using a decision 
rule of a=O.05, we reject both hypotheses ( WP does not Granger Cause RP, and RP does not 
Granger Cause WP) and conclude with 95% confidence that bilateral causality or feedback exists 
between \vholesale and retail prices. However, a look at the F-statistic probabilities suggests 
stronger causality from wholesale to retail than the opposite. This result is again supported by 
our understanding of the market structure and information systems. 
Causality tests are highly sensitive to the sampling frame and period of analysis chosen 
and, consequently, need to be supported by the underlying basic conditions of the market and 
infonnation systems. Both farmers in rural areas and retailers in urban areas use wholesale price 
as a benchmark in their market transactions. We therefore expect prices to flow from wholesale 
level in both directions to farmers and retailers. Though uni-direction causality was not detected 
using the Granger tests, results from these tests hint toward such a price flow system. This 
direction of price flow is illustrated in .figure 3 below. 
.:. 
Figure 3. Direction of Price Flow 
I Farm-gate IfooI.....-------1 Wholesale I~-----",;"~I Retail I 
-
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B. Asymmetry in Price Transmission 
The test for asymmetry aims to establish if increases and decreases in wholesale prices 
are transmitted symmetrically to farmers and retailers, given that prices are determined at the 
wholesale level. The presence of asymmetric price transmission is an indicator of an ill-
performing market, as Tomek and Robinson (1990) argue, that asymmetric or sticky price 
behavior suggests imperfectly competitive markets. 
This price behavior occurs as players with market power (i.e wholesalers in our case) 
transmit more slowly price changes that benefit them while transmitting faster price changes that 
are a cost to them. Farm level prices are often more responsive to a drop in wholesale prices than 
they are to a rise. This pattern is often a result of collusive behavior at middlemen level. In 
addition, imperfect information might avail a temporal advantage to some market players 
resulting in some inter-stage price stickiness (Kohls and Uhl, 1980). 
The Model 
To run the relevant model and perform the tests, the data used in price flow tests was 
transformed to generate the following new variables: 
'" 
CFP, = Change in Farm Price = Fp, - Fpt_] 
WPit = Wholesale Price Increase = WPt - wp,_\ ifWPt ) wpt_Jand = 0, otherwise 
WPDt = Wholesale Price Decrease = WPt - wp'_J ifWPt <WPt_1 and = 0, otherwise 
CRP. =Change in Retail Price = RPt - Rp._J 
Rudolf (1971) developed an approach to detecting nonreversible functions. Houck 
-

(1977) applied this technique to detect asymmetric price transmission in what has come to be 
knovm as the 'Houck procedure'. Assuming that our results from the causality tests indicate 
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unidirectional causation from wholesale prices (WP, ) to fann prices (FP, ), Houck tests the 
hypothesis that a unit increase in wholesale prices will have a different absolute effect on fann 
prices from a unit decrease in wholesale prices. The Houck procedure consists of estimating the 
following equation in first differences by ordinary least squares (OLS): 
(3) 
Where, .dFPt = FP. - Fp._l 
.dWPi. = wp. - WPt-1 ifWP.) WP'_ l and 
= 0 otherwise (price increase) 
.dWPdt = WP t - \\'P._1 ifWPt (WP•. 1 and 
= 0 otherwise (price decrease), 
with FP and WP as defined before. 
A non-reversibility or asymmetry occurs in .dFPt if the coefficient for a price increase is 
different from that of a price decrease (a l * a2). A t-test is used to test for the statistical 
differences between the two coefficienls. Houck notes two main problems with this method: 
First is the loss of explanatory power of the first row of observations due to differencing. And 
second, is the likely correlation between the two explanatory variables that might lead to 
statistical problems if not corrected. 
Estimation, Results and Discussion 
Asymmetry in price transmission was tested at two points in the market channel, namely, 
the farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail levels. ­
15 
Wholesale-Farm Price transmission 
To test for asymmetric price transmission from wholesale to rural farmers, the following 
OLS regression was run: 
(4)
 
Where ao is an intercept term, a l is the effect of wholesale prices on farm prices when wholesale 
prices are increasing, and a2 is the effect of wholesale prices on farm prices when wholesale 
prices are decreasing. The regression results are given in Table 2. 
Table 2.	 Houck procedure for Wholesale-Farm Price transmission 
LS II Dependent Variable is CFP N=30 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.215184 0.159560 1.348607 0.1887 
WPI 0.353271 0.206575 1.710131 0.0987 
WPD 0.979772 0.177723 5.512911 0.0000 
'. 
R-squared 0.699431 .F-statistic 31.41480 
Adjusted R-squared 0.677167 Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.021107 Cov «aI' a2) -0.020249 
To detect asymmetry in price transmission, we test equality in the coefficients ~ and a2 
(Ho: a/ =a2, HI: a1 not equal to a2). A non-reversibility or asymmetric transmission occurs when 
the coefficient for price increases (a l ) is statistically different from the coefficient for price 
-

decreases (a2).	 Under classical assumptions, this two tail test follows a t-distribution with n-k 
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degree of freedom (where n is the number of observations and k is the number of parameters 
estimated including the intercept). Our test statistic is as follows; 
(5)
 
Using the formula above, our calculated t is 1.8503. For 27 degrees of freedom (30-3), the 
calculated t-value exceeds the critical t-value at 10% level of significance but not at 5% (two tail 
test). Hence we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients al and a2 are equal and conclude 
with 90% confidence that the effect of increasing wholesale prices is statistically different from 
that of decreasing prices. Price transmission from wholesale to farm level is asymmetric. 
According to the regression results, only $0.35 of a $1 increase in wholesale prices are 
immediately transmitted to the farm level whereas $0.97 ofa $1 price decrease at wholesale level 
would be immediately transferred to the farm level or rural markets. Middlemen between 
wholesale and farm level transmit slowly price changes that benefit them, but transmit rapidly 
price changes that would otherwise di~.advantage them. As Tomek and Robinson (1991 ) confer, 
such symmetric or sticky price behavior suggests perfectly competitive market structures that 
allow some degree of collusive behavior among middlemen. 
These results are consistent with the market structure along the channel, whereby 
wholesalers, by virtue of them being the smallest number of channel participants, are apt to wield 
greater market power than either farmers or retailers. Another contributing factor to such 
-
behavior is the relatively poor market information at farm level that avails a temporal advantage 
to middlemen when wholesale prices increase. 
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Wholesale-Retail Price Transmission 
Similarly, asymmetric price transmission from wholesale to retail was tested by running 
the following OLS regression 
(6)
 
The regression results are given in Table 3. Interpretation of the coefficients and subsequent 
hypothesis testing procedure are similar to those discussed in the previous section. 
Table 3.	 Houck procedure for Wholesale-Retail Price transmission 
LS II Dependent Variable is CRP 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.106312 0.561920 0.189194 0.8514 
\VPI 1.233366 0.727491 1.695369 0.1015 
WPD 1.677356 0.625884 2.679978 0.0124 
R-squared 0.445090 F-statistic 10.82828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403986 Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000352 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.358594 ,Cov «aI' a2) -0.251134 
For 27 degrees of freedom (30-3), the observed t-value is less than the critical t-value 
even up to a 50% level of significance (two-tail test). Therefore, we fail to reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients, a j and a2, are equal and conclude that the coefficients for increasing 
wholesale prices and decreasing prices are not statistically different. Price transmission from 
wholesale to retail is symmetric. This result is indicative of some level of market efficiency 
­
between wholesale and retail levels. Higher market efficiency at this level is facilitated by better 
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price infonnation efficiency between these levels, a lesson that could be applied to improve 
efficiency between wholesale and fann levels. 
IV. Spatial Market Integration 
An important aspect of horticultural marketing in Zimbabwe is the movement of 
commodities from surplus markets to deficit markets during given times of the year. The 
efficiency of such inter-market exchange is predicated on the perfect transmission of price signals 
between the source market and the sink market. The transmission of price signals between 
markets is captured by market price integration. Price integration can be defined as the co­
movement of prices between markets (Jones, 1984). 
An empirical tool for testing the existence, or not, of spatial arbitrage is market 
integration analysis. Markets are said to be spatially integrated if they exhibit a co-movement of 
prices between the corresponding price series (Jones, 1984; Goletti and Babu, 1994). Put 
differently, a market is spatially integrated to other markets if prices in the market do not only 
respond to local supply and demand cQnditions, but also to the aggregate supply and demand of 
all the other markets to which it is connected. 
Clearly, spatial market integration is an aspect of market perfonnance. By shipping a 
product from areas of abundance and low prices to areas of scarcity and high prices, spatial 
arbitrage is less prejudicial to producers in the source market and consumers in the sink market. 
This welfare benefit is accentuated in settings where marked dissimilarities in production 
-between regional markets exist, and this scenario is characteristic of the smallholder horticultural 
.. 
marketing system in Zimbabwe during the dry season. In the long run, market integration may 
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foster horticultural production according to patterns of comparative advantage (Mendoza and 
Rosegrant, 1995). 
Knowledge of the structure of market integration enables policy makers to forecast the 
price effect of a shock in one regional market on other regional markets to which it is connected. 
By identifying the factors inimical to market integration, remedial policy interventions can be 
designed (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). Efforts to assess market integration in the smallholder 
domestic horticultural markets, and suggestions for improvements thereof, are therefore 
consistent with the government objective of improving the welfare (or income) positions of both 
smallholder farmers and the low income section of urban dwellers. 
Data 
The data used in this analysis was collected in Zimbabwe from August to December, 
1996 (Guvheya, 1998). With the aid of a team of six enumerators, daily tomato wholesale prices 
were collected in the seven urban horticultural marketplaces namely, Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, 
Chitungwiza, Chinhoyi, Marondera and Bindura. The data to be analyzed is a set of seven series 
of contemporaneous daily wholesale pt~ces for tomatoes. The series for Harare, Bulawayo and 
Mutare are the longest, with five month's worth of daily (excluding weekends) data, from August 
to December of 1996. The remaining four series are a month shorter, running from September to 
December of the same year. 
The Model 
The analysis on spatial market integration seeks to address three questions about the 
-

nature of the price transmission process between pairs of regional markets. First, are markets 
integrated or not? Second, how long does it take for a price shock in one market to be 
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transmitted to the other market to which it is connected? and third, how much of a price change 
in one market is transmitted to the other market? Cointegration analysis is used to find out if 
markets are integrated or not. However, cointegration analysis is only concerned with the 
existence of a long-run equilibrium between markets, and cannot answer questions pertaining to 
the price adjustment process over time. Recourse is therefore made to dynamic analysis, using 
autoregressive models to establish whether or not markets are integrated in the short-run, and 
how long it takes for a price change in one market to be transmitted to another. In addition, the 
dynamic analysis is used to quantify the total impact of a price change in one market on another 
market. 
Cointegration between two contemporaneous price series will indicate that the 
corresponding markets are spatially integrated. The notion of cointegration can be explained in 
the following way. Although the individual variables are random walk, a linear combination of 
these variables might be stationary, in which case the two variables are said to be cointegrated. 
The mechanics for inspecting if the two variables are cointegrated requires that we set up a 
cointegrating regression, i.e, 
(7)
 
(8)
 
Using the ADF procedure, if £, is stationary, i.e if £,_1(0), then 1'; and X; are cointegrated. In this 
case, the procedure is called the augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test (Engle and Granger, 
1987). In general, if Yf""J1(d) and Xf""J1(d) , with the d-value the same in both cases, Y, and X, can 
be cointegrated. Although individually nonstationary, regressing the variables in levels is 
statistically valid if cointegration holds. 
-
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Cointegration analysis is concerned only with the judgement as to whether a long-run 
relationship between markets exists or not. Yet the knowledge that markets are integrated or not, 
alone, may be quite limiting for policy analysis. In addition, need exists to know also the degree 
or extent of market integration, which naturally leads to measuring the magnitude of the price 
transmission process (Goletti and Babu, 1994). In such an analysis, a distinction should be made 
between the immediate impact of price shocks and the impact that builds over time. The notion 
of dynamic multipliers is used to compute the short-run and long-run magnitudes. Also, the 
analysis of dynamic adjustments allows study of a related concept - the speed of price 
transmission - how long it takes for a price shock in one market to be transmitted to another 
market's price. 
Two modeling approaches will be taken, depending on the way markets are organized 
across space. Evidence gathered during primary data collection suggests two fonns of spatial 
market organization. First, a radial market configuration exists among Harare and the 
surrounding urban markets, namely, Bindura, Chinhoyi, Chitungwiza and Marondera. Harare is 
expected to dominate price fonnation because of the large volume of trade that it handles 
. 
compared to the volume of transactions in each of the smaller urban markets. In addition, the 
level of intra satellite market trade is quite negligible relative to trade between each of the 
satellite markets and Harare. Such an organization fits the radial market configuration in the 
literature (Ravallion, 1986). In that breadth, Harare becomes the central market, and the smaller 
markets the satellite markets. On the other hand, it is assumed that less primacy exists in price 
­
fonnation among Bulawayo, Harare and Mutare, principally owing to the large distances 
spanning the markets, and the relatively less variation in market sizes. 
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Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare 
Modeling these three markets takes the form of investigating if relationships between 
price series for pairs of markets exist. Three such pairs of markets will be considered, namely, 
(Bulawayo, Harare), (Bulawayo, Mutare) and (Harare, Mutare). For every pair of markets i andj, 
consider the following bivariate autoregressive model (Goletti and Babu, 1994): 
k=mi h=ni 
P	 = ~ (X P + ~ p P +X Y+E 
1,1	 L.J I,k I,I-k L.J I,h j.l-h 1,1 I 1,1 
k= J h=o (9) 
The dependent variable is the price in market i at time t, and PI.! is the price in marketj at time t. 
Exogenous variables such as frost periods in the case of tomato production that will have an 
impact on the way market prices relate to each other are captured by A: /' 
The extent of market integration will be assessed by measuring both the magnitude of 
price transmission and the time needed to adjust. The magnitude of the price transmission 
process is estimated by long-run or total dynamic multipliers. From (9), the cumulative effect of 
a shock to price in marketj on the price in market i, after a maximum k periods is given by: 
-
(10)
 
The time needed to adjust is given by the length of the lag, h=ni in (9). The smaller the length of 
lag, for the same magnitude of price transmission, the better the integration between the markets 
concerned. 
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Harare, Chitungwiza, Chinhoyi, Marondera and Bindura 
As has been discussed before, the spatial organization of these markets approximates the 
radial market configuration. In this case, Harare is the central market, and each of the remaining 
the satellite markets. Trade with the central market dominates price formation in the local 
markets, although there might be some trade among the local markets. The dynamic model has 
the analytical advantage that alternative hypotheses of market integration and market 
segmentation can be nested within a more general model and tested as restricted forms. 
Following the classic work of Ravallion (1986), consider the following model. 
(central market price) (11) 
P, = f,(P jJ X), i = 2, ,N (local market prices) (12) 
where. X, (i=2, N) is a vector of other (non-price) influences on local markets and N is the 
number of spatial markets in the analysis. Equations (11) and (12) constitute a static 
representation of the data-generating process for a simple radial configuration of markets, in 
which each satellite market trades directly with the central market. 
Assuming a linear form for the-I, functions (i=2, ..... ,N), and allowing for a suitable 
-. 
dynamic structure, the econometric versions of (11) and (12) for a T-period series of prices for 
N-regions follow: 
Pit =r,
n 
a,/iI_) + r, n b,/It_j+ciXi1t +eit (13))= I )=0 
-
(14)
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where i = 2 ,N, the e's are the appropriate error terms and the a's, b's and c's are the true but 
unknown population parameters. 
In words, equations (13) and (14) represent a data-generating process in which the current 
price for each local market is a function of its own past prices as well as present and past prices 
in a trading region. Usually, only (13) is identified (Ravallion, 1986), and (14) is often inflicted 
with the problem of simultaneity. However, in this analysis emphasis will be placed on (13); 
hence. the endogeneity of the explanatory variables in (14) will not concern us. As stated before, 
alternative hypotheses about market integration are nested within equations (13) and (14) and can 
be tested as the appropriate restricted forms. 
Observe that for the purposes of estimation, equation (13) is just a special form of (9), 
where the second summation term is always made up of present and past values of prices in the 
central market. Since the hypotheses of concern in this analysis are all nested within (13), the 
modeling approaches for the two sets of markets converge to the same autoregressive model. 
Hence, the same hypotheses and testing procedures will be adopted in analyzing whether pairs 
between Harare and the satellite mark~s are cointegrated or not, and in investigating the price 
transmission process. This harmonization offers the advantage that the same hypotheses are 
tested for the two sets of markets, allo\\;'ng comparisons across the different pairs of markets. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Tables 4 and 5 below present a summary description of the data that characterize the 
-
apparent relationships among the urban horticult';ITal markets being studied. Simple correlations 
, . 
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Table 4.	 Summary Data for the Urban Horticultural Markets, 
24 September - 27 December, 1996. 
Type of Data Chitungwiza Chinhoyi Marondera Bindura Mutare Byo· 
Distance to Harare 30 115 74 88 263 439
 
(kIn)
 
Mean daily price
 
differential ($/kg) .45 1.17 2.40 .97 .75 3.26 
Standard deviation
 
of price differential .67 .66 1.28 .61 .73 2.12
 
Simple correlation .7339 .4969 .4762 .5366 .2204 .7506
 
of price with Harare 
Population** 274,912 43,054 39,384 21,167 131,367 621,742 
For the descriptive statistics, n =67. The price differentials are in absolute values, and they are 
calculated as the difference in price between each market and Harare. *Byo is short for 
Bulawayo. **Harare's population is 1,189,103. 
Source: Field Survey data, 1996; CSO (1994). 
are used to show a preliminary picture of the relationship among horticultural markets across 
space. While suffering from many analytical deficiencies (Harris-White, 1979), simple 
correlations are a suitable starting poi~. 
".' 
Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration analysis is the tool that has been used to establish whether markets have a 
tendency towards a long-run equilibrium or not. A technical note is in order. Cointegration 
between a pair of price series denotes a long-run equilibrium, and does not guarantee a short-run 
equilibrium. Stated in other words, cointegration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
­
short-run market integration. If markets are cointegrated, any short-term disequilibria 
(segmentation) is conceived as part of an adjustment process towards"along-run equilibrium. 
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Recall the following model:
 
(15)
 
where Yr and XI are the price series for the pairs of markets being investigated. Using the
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure we can perform a unit-root stationarity test on the error term
 
from (15), given as:
 
(16) 
If the series £:{ is stationary, then the two price series are said to be cointegrated. 
When contemporaneous prices between two markets are cointegrated, we say that the two 
markets are spatially integrated. Let us now investigate if pairs of markets are cointegrated. 
Table 5 below shows results of cointegration analysis between the pairs of markets that were 
established during data collection as having significant direct trade with each other. 
Table 5. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Root on Residuals 
from Cointegrating Regressions 
ADF Critical Value 
Market Pair T-Statistic 5% 10% Decision DW N 
Chitungwiza, Harare -5.170977 -3.4713 -3.1624 Ho rejected 2.13 73 
Chinhoyi, Harare -3.655647 -3.4801 -3.1675 Ho rejected 2.05 64 
Marondera, Harare -4.314482 -3.4673 -3.1601 Ho rejected 1.98 78 
Bindura, Harare -3.738261 -3.4673 -3.1601 Ho rejected 1.9 78 
Mutare, Harare -4.932610 -3.4713 -3.1624 Ho rejected 1.98 73 
Bulawayo, Harare -2.703850 -3.4561 -3.1536 Ho not rejected 2.02 97 
Bulawayo, Mutare -2.183912 -3.4713 -3.1624 Ho not rejected 2.03 73 
-Marondera, Chit.* -3.635499 -3.4713 -3.1624 Ho rejected 2.09 73 
Source: Field Survey data, 1996 
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From the table it can be seen that the following pairs of markets are cointegrated: 
(Chitungwiza, Harare), (Chinhoyi, Harare), (Bindura, Harare), (Mutare, Harare) and (Marondera, 
Chitungwiza). However, (Bulawayo, Harare) and (Bulawayo, Mutare) are not cointegrated. 
These results confonn to our intuition in that markets that are closer to each other and connected 
by well developed infrastructure are integrated and markets that are far-flung are not. This result 
is also corroborated by the patterns of intennarket trade flows as they were observed during the 
data collection period, that more significant trade in tomatoes exists among Harare and the 
Statellite markets than among Harare, Mutare and Bulawayo. Also, the inter-market distance 
between Harare and Mutare is about half the distance between Bulawayo and Harare. In general, 
markets in geographical proximity are more likely to trade with each other, thereby raising the 
possibility of spatial market integration. 
Dynamic adjustment 
Having established which markets are integrated through the cointegration analysis, the 
next task is to analyze the dynamics ofthe price transmission process. The dynamic analysis will 
.. 
shed light on three questions. First, what is the magnitude of the price transmission process? In 
other words, if there is a price shock in one market, how much of it is transmitted to the other 
market after the full adjustment process? Second, how long does it take for a shock in one 
market to be transmitted to another market? Put ·differently, what is the duration or speed of the 
adjustment process? Third, are markets integrated in the short-tenn? As has been reiterated 
­
earlier on, cointegration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for short-tenn integration. 
28 
It should be stated that dynamic analysis makes sense for markets that are cointegrated, 
or, more technically, when the necessary condition for market integration is met. Recall from the 
cointegration analysis that the following pairs of markets have been established as being 
integrated in the long run: Harare and Mutare, Harare and each of Chitungwiza, Chinhoyi, 
Marondera and Bindura, as well as Chitungwiza and Marondera. 
For the sake of estimation and hypothesis testing, one basic autoregressive model will be 
used. In view of the nonstationarity in the levels of the price series, the following transfonnation 
to the data has been made: 
(17) 
where Y" * is now interpreted as the percentage change of price in market i at time t. This 
transfonnation has been usual practice in the literature (Palaskas and Harris-White, 1994; Golleti 
and Babu, 1993), and it has two principal advantages. First, inter-correlations between the 
transfonned series are sufficiently Jow thereby allaying the problem of multicollinearity that is 
common in estimating autoregressive and distributed lag models. Second, the transfonned series 
are stationary. 
~'. 
Let us now invoke the autoregressive model from equation (17): 
k~"'i h~ni 
P1,1 =" a PI,I-k L.J PI,hP IL.J l,k + " j,l-h +X1,1Y+E i,1 
k~1 h~o 
-

where P,,1 and PI,' are in percentage changes. Notice that equation (13) is a special case of (17), in 
which the second summation is made up of present and lagged values of the price series in the 
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central market. The estimation proceeds as follows. A generous lag structure is estimated, which 
is then pared dov·.'Jl by significance testing. Table 6 below presents results of the dynamic 
analysis. 
Table 6 Dynamic Adjustments: Cross Long-run Multipliers 
(CRLM) and Speed of Adjustment 
CLRM Speed of Adjustment* 
First effects Last effects 
Harare, Chitungwiza 0.787 
Harare. Chinhoyi 0.062 TI3 
Harare, Marondera 0.599 TI3 
Harare, Bindura 
Harare, Mutare 0.245 
Chitungv,'iza, Marondera 
(-) indicates that the corresponding could not be calculated. Tj,Tj , isj, is the duration between the 
first and last days when the effects of a price change in one market were felt in the other market. 
Source: Field Survey, 1996. 
Recall that the cross long-rum multiplier was defined as the total impact of a price change 
in one market on another market's pric'~ if the change is sustained. This concept is intimately 
related to cointegration. Having established that markets are integrated in the long run, the 
second logical step is to find out how much of a price change in one market is transmitted to 
another market if the adjustment process proceeds uninterrupted. Unfortunately, the analysis was 
indeterminate for (Harare, Bindura) and (Harare, Mutare). The same problem applies to (Harare, 
Chinhoyi), for which the last effects of the adjustment could not be established, and the CLRM ­
,., 
was calculated for only one time period; the figure 0.062 should be viewed with caution. These 
problems arise if the markets are individually unstable. 
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A few comments on the market pairs (Harare, Chtitungwiza), (Harare, Marondera) and 
(Harare, Mutare) follow. The price transmission process between Harare and Chtitungwiza is the 
greatest. Also, this pair of markets has the smallest time needed to adjust, hence the greatest 
speed ofadjustment. Given that the CLRM and Speed of Adjustment are the highest, we can say 
that Chitungwiza is the most integrated of the three pairs of markets. This is the kind of analysis 
that should ideally be done; however, it depends critically on whether the data is well-behaved, 
and we are not so blessed here. 
An interesting feature in Table 6 is the one-to-one correspondence between CLRM and 
inter-market distances. The closer the markets are together, the greater the size of the 
transmission process. This pattern most probably results from the greater information flows, 
lower transportation costs and greater possibilities of arbitrage in general. Based on the strong 
relationship between the CLRM and inter-market distances, we can infer the statistics for 
(Harare, Bindura) and (Chitungwiza, Marondera). For example, the CLRM for (Harare, 
Bindura) would be expected to be between 0.599 and 0.245. 
Conclusions and Polic)' Recommendations 
".. 
The purpose of this research was to characterize the operation of the smallholder 
horticultural marketing system in Zimbabwe that have adverse effects on market performance 
and make suggestions for improving the welfare of farmers and consumers. Three inter-related 
aspects of market performance were investigated, namely, distributive marketing margins, the 
determination and symmetry of prices along the main marketing channels, and the degree of 
-

spatial market integration. The ultimate aim of the study was to identify key areas that could 
form the basis for improving the performance of the horticultural marketing system. In the 
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sequel, the main conclusions are presented and the implications of the study for both public and 
private policy discussed. 
Margins, Price Flow and Price Transmission 
Correlation coefficients reveal a high degree of linear association between prices at 
different levels; 0.97 between farm and wholesale prices, 0.85 between wholesale and retail 
prices, and 0.84 between farm and retail prices. The average farm-wholesale gross margin 
(FWGM) of $0.44/kg is much lower than the wholesale-retail gross margin (WRGM) of 
$1.76/kg. The dynamics of margins in relations to prices at different levels hints at inefficiencies 
in the channel and high economies of scale in marketing hints at inefficiencies in the channel and 
high economies of scale in marketing. 
Price causality was tested between pairs of adjacent levels (farm-wholesale and wholesale 
retail). Through Granger causality test and our knowledge on market structure and conduct, it 
was determined that prices flow from wholesale to farm level and from wholesale to retail. The 
Houck procedure results indicate asymmetric transmission of prices between wholesale and farm 
level which is indicative of inefficiencIfs in the channel between these points. Transmission of 
prices between wholesale and retail was symmetric. Though margins are lower between farm­
gate and wholesale, there are greater inefficiencies between these level which can be largely 
attributed to poor market information system and limited transportation. 
Spatial Market Integration 
Information obtained from inter-market correlations dismisses the possibility of strong 
­
1".­
market integration among the spatial markets of concern in this study. This conclusion comes in 
the wake of the result that inter-market correlations are at most 0.7506, a moderate relationship 
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by the standards of the theory of statistics. Three comments arise from examining the patterns of 
inter-market correlations in price levels. 
First, Bulawayo is apparently significantly related to the other markets, particularly 
Harare, Chitungwiza, Marondera, Bindura and Chinhoyi, contrary to the evidence from the 
pattern of the physical flow of commodities across space, wherein Bulawayo is revealed as 
disconnected from virtually all the other markets for the period of the analysis. The second 
comment is that the correlations among Harare and the satellite markets are greater than the inter­
relations among the major urban centers net of Bulawayo. Third, the significant relationship 
between Mutare and Harare, and indeed with the other markets is a derived relationship in the 
sense that the two cities do not directly trade with each other in tomatoes; rather, they are related 
via a common source region, that is, the irrigation schemes in the south-eastern lowveld. 
Correlations of differenced data show markedly lower levels of inter-market connections, 
raising some suspicion that part of the static correlations in price levels is due to spurious 
reasons. This possibility could very well be the case with Bulawayo, a case of significant 
correlation between markets when in a,ctual fact they are physically disconnected. A probable 
reason for the existence of spurious regressions is non-stationarity of the data, quite inherent in 
agricultural time series. Expectedly, all the price series were nonstationary in levels. 
Hence, the patterns of inter-market relationships arising from static correlation analysis 
should be augmented with finer analysis. Cointegration tests on transformed data indicated that 
the following pairs of markets are cointegrated: (Harare, Chitungwiza), (Harare, Chinhoyi), 
-
(Harare, Bindura), (Harare, Marondera) and (Harare, Mutare). Markets that are integrated 
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indicate that over the long haul, the respective prices move in confonnity with each other, 
through the arbitraging actions of traders. Note the fallout of Bulawayo! 
Two reasons exist for the segmentation between Bulawayo and all the other markets. 
First, Bulawayo is over 400 kilometers from Harare and about 700 kilometers from Mutare. 
These long inter-market distances imply huge transport costs that are prohibitive for inter-market 
trade. Second, the long distances between markets imply that it is nigh impossible to obtain 
infonnation pertaining to regional prices and supply conditions - requirements for spatial 
arbitrage hence market integration. 
Of a pair of integrated markets, how much of a price change in one market is transmitted 
to the other market? Alternatively, what is the size of the price transmission process? 
Unfortunately, the data is such that results for some market pairs were indetenninate. 
Fortunately, though, results for some 'strategic' pairs of markets were obtained. Of the valid 
results, the price transmission process between Harare and Chitungwiza is the largest (0.787), 
followed by the one between Harare and Marondera (0.599). The transmission process between 
Harare and Mutare is the least (0.245)."",. This gradation mirrors rather closely the respective inter­
'. 
market distances. In other words, the greater the inter-market distance the larger the size of the 
price transmission process. 
Also, the price adjustment process between Harare and Chitungwiza takes place in the 
shortest time, in two days, compared to Harare and Marondera (3 days) and Harare and Mutare (5 
days). Infonnation from the size and speed of the price transmission process enables us to say in 
-

a composite way that (Chitungwiza, Harare) is the most integrated market pair. 
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The markets for which valid results were obtained has been termed strategic in the sense 
that they are spatially positioned such that they enable us to impute the nature of the price 
transmission process of the markets for which results were indeterminate. For example, the sizes 
of the price transmission process for (Harare, Chinhoyi) and (Harare, Bindura) are expected to be 
between those for (Harare, Chitungwiza) and (Harare, Mutare) and close to (Harare, Marondera), 
going by the strong relationship between market integration and inter-market distances. 
Policy Implications 
In spite of the interest in smallholder horticulture, public policy involvement in 
smallholder horticultural production has been passive at best. As a result, smallholder 
horticultural marketing has been, and is, taking place in an environment that lacks infrastructure 
and is hampered by lack of accessible and reliable market information. In addition, farm-level 
constraints have led to low and inferior quality production, rendering smallholder farmers unable 
to take full advantage of any existent market windows. 
Given the backdrop ofthe ongging economic policy reforms and the accessory 
.... 
liberalization of agricultural marketing, government can adopt facilitative, functional, and 
regulatory policies to improve market performance and societal welfare in the informal 
horticultural sector. 
Most of the present extension efforts are production centered, resulting in most farmers 
producing in the same period of time according to the dictates of agro-climatic conditions. This 
-

state of affairs results in most farmers following the same cropping schedule and husbandry 
practices, leading to a highly seasonal supply pattern. Instead, extension efforts need to include 
-35 
market-centered approaches to assist farmers develop better marketing strategies. Information on 
long-term trends and seasonality of prices for the major crops should be disseminated to farmers 
to farmers so that they take advantage of market windows. Better access to market intelligence 
would reduce risk and uncertainty, thereby increasing the social pie. Smallholder farmers benefit 
by exploiting market windows while the urban consumers benefit from the stable and lower 
pnces. 
The high seasonality in prices reveals an opportunity for time arbitrage. Although 
perishability of horticultural produce makes direct storage expensive and non-profitable, 
opportunities for arbitrage exist through processing. Most vegetables can be sun dried in periods 
of glut and marketed in times of market shortages. Currently, some farmers sun dry tomatoes 
and leafy vegetables. It is a challenge for research and extension to improve sun drying 
techniques and expand their use to more crops. Processing companies could take advantage of 
the seasonality by canning fruits and vegetables in times of peak supply and selling them at a 
profit in times of shortage. 
Evidence suggests that marketi~g agents are engaged in collusive behavior, indicative of 
'. 
imperfect marketing conditions. In times of peak supply, bottlenecks in transport facilities 
worsen the bargaining position of farmers. As a temporal measure, the government could 
supplement the services of transporters especially in remote areas. It is imperative to run such 
operations on profitable bases so as not to distort marketing forces or crowd out other 
middlemen. Success stories such as the Mashonaland East Fruit and Vegetable Program could be 
•.. 
duplicated in other areas of high production. 
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Three factors have stuck out prominently as impediments to greater market integration 
among the urban horticultural markets, namely the lack of access to quality market information 
by farmers and traders, lack of a credit facility to finance informal horticultural trade and the 
rudimentary nature of the transport system in inter-market trade. 
Market information plays a facilitative role in the marketing process. The access by all 
market participants to timely, accurate and comprehensive market information is important in 
two fundamental ways. First, it has been established in this study that market information can act 
as an entry barrier at the wholesale level, sheltering experienced incumbents from competition by 
potential and new entrants. Second, symmetrical access to market information improves the 
bargaining process during price discovery between transacting agents, hence pricing efficiency. 
Third, freely available information on regional product availabilities and prices is simply a 
necessary condition for market integration through its facilitation of inter-market arbitrage. In 
general, market information is essential for the competitiveness of the marketing system through 
its effect on long-term resource allocation and short-term marketing strategy. The public good 
nature of market information necessitates government provision. A public market information 
system should distinguish between 'market information' regarding current supplies and prices 
and market intelligence or outlook data. 
The lack of formal credit tailored to the circumstances of informal horticultural traders 
has real costs in terms of greater market concent~ation at the wholesale level and the attendant 
problems of loss in pricing efficiency and inequity. Also, lack of access to credit to participate in 
-
spatial arbitrage during the scarcity months has a direct stifling effect on market integration. 
Government can facilitate the smallholder horticultural marketing process by enhancing traders' 
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access to formal credit. The state can do this in two ways. First, in a macroeconomic sense, 
government needs to rescind the tight monetary policy, itself a result of the large budget deficit 
(over 10 percent of GDP) to lower interest rates and make it easier for investors to borrow 
money. Traders who have the requisite collateral can then borrow more easily. 
Although the design of this study did not explicitly consider transport variables, it is clear 
that transport issues are a real determinant of how well markets are integrated across space. One 
reason why inter-market distance is such a major explainer of the pattern of market integration is 
that it determines transport costs. Transport creates place utility, as well as playing a role in 
market development, expansion and fostering regional competition. Also, the unreliability of 
transport in inter-market trade is a source of risk. Government can improve the transport situation 
in two ways. The state can playa facilitative role by improving the quality and enhancing the 
density of roads connecting trading regions. In addition, the state can playa facilitative role in 
improving the transport situation by making it easier for private entrepreneurs to purchase and 
operate faster refrigerated trucks that minimize damage of the produce in transit and the time 
needed to move produce between regia.pal markets.
, 
The smallholder horticultural marketing system is conspicuously lacking in a system of 
grades and standards, which are typically established and enforced by government to facilitate the 
marketing process. Grades and standards simplify marketing and reduce marketing costs, can 
lower search and transaction costs and foster a more efficient price discovery process. In relation 
to spatial arbitrage, grading may decrease transport costs and reduce spoilage. 
­
Lack of on-farm storage gives rise to the 'distress' sales that farmers make either when 
they sale their produce at the farm-gate or in the central market. The highly perishable nature of 
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tomatoes lowers fanners bargaining power during price discovery, often forcing farmers to 
accept prices that do not bear any relation to costs. Also, on-fann storage enables fanners to hold 
onto the produce until such a time when returns could be highest as the market outlook suggests. 
On-farm storage is a huge investment, requiring spacious facilities that are refrigerated and 
minimize both decay and pest damage. Since we are talking of small, geographically diffused 
farmers, the storage facilities should be well cited to achieve the required threshold holding for 
profitability. These huge investments make a case for government investment in on-farm 
storage. However, needs exists to assess the economic returns relative to the costs both in a 
static and dynamic sense. 
-

.... 
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